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          This study investigates how the media produces information. Using a sample of 
296,497 Wall Street Journal news articles, I find that news articles written by experienced 
and reputable financial journalists are more informative about future earnings. I then 
examine the source of such information advantage by studying the detailed quotes from 
news articles. I further find that these journalists rely more heavily on first-hand access to 
management, institutional investors, and other external experts, an important channel 
through which they produce informative news. Interestingly, however, this information 
advantage is present only when the experienced and reputable journalists remain 
independent — for those journalists that repeatedly cover the same firm or rely primarily 
on information from management, the networking information advantage is completely 
muted.  
Further, I perform two additional tests. In the first test, I employ news articles about 
firm fundamentals, and in the second I use a revised measure of information content by 
including Dow Jones Business News. I continue to find that the information advantage of 
experienced and reputable journalists obtains only when these journalists remain 
independent. 
These results suggest that the quality of the media as an information intermediary 
depends critically on individual journalists’ ability to access information from industry 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A growing literature in accounting and finance examines the role of the media as an 
information intermediary and its effect on capital markets. While there is now ample evidence that 
the media matters, we know surprisingly little about the people who provide the news—financial 
journalists. As nicely put by Dougal et al. (2012), “the media is often modeled as a faceless 
institution, but its main product—news content—is generated by people.” What is the role of 
individual financial journalist as an information intermediary and how do they produce information? 
The purpose of this paper is to bridge this gap in the literature by examining the effect of individual 
journalists on the informativeness of media news and their source of information. 
Recent research shows that media plays an important role in providing value relevant 
information to capital market participants. For example, Miller (2006) provides evidence that the 
press serves as a watchdog for accounting fraud. Tetlock et al. (2008) show that media tone can 
predict firms’ fundamentals. Dougal et al. (2012) find that the exogenous scheduling of Wall Street 
Journal (WSJ) columnists has a significant fixed effect on market returns. These findings suggest 
that at least some, if not all, journalists produce information. A natural question that follows is: 
What makes some journalists more informative than others, and more importantly, what are the 
channels through which they produce information? In this study, I first focus on two journalist 
attributes – experience and reputation – and examine whether journalists with more experience and 
a higher reputation generate more informative news. 1  I then investigate whether journalists’ 
information advantage, if any, varies with access to information from industry networks and with 
firm-specific experience. 
1 In additional analyses, I further examine whether journalists’ gender and education affect the informativeness of 
their news articles. 
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To address these questions, I obtain an initial sample of 296,497 WSJ news articles covering 
S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 firms over the July 1995 to June 2012 period. 
Because the focus of the paper is on the effect of financial journalists, I exclude articles without an 
author, resulting in a sample of 132,107 WSJ news articles by 1,404 unique journalists.2 I manually 
collect data on several journalist attributes, including experience, reputation, and other individual 
characteristics (e.g., gender, age, education), using LinkedIn and personal webpages, among other 
sources. To capture experience I use the number of years the WSJ author has been a journalist (not 
only at the WSJ). I proxy for reputation using two indicator variables, namely, whether the 
journalist has been a columnist and whether the journalist has received or been a finalist for a 
Pulitzer Prize, Gerald Loeb Award, or John Hancock Award. To measure the qualitative 
information of news articles, I construct the following two measures. First, I follow the approach 
of Tetlock et al. (2008) and use the fraction of negative words in firm-specific news articles to 
measure the “tone” of an article (hereafter, media tone). This measure, however, captures only one 
dimension of the qualitative information and it might not reflect the unique information content of 
a news article, which is important in the context of this study because there can be several news 
articles with similar tone that are released around the same time. In order to better capture the 
unique new information from an article, I follow an approach similar to that of Tetlock (2011), 
Hoberg and Phillips (2011), and Brown and Tucker (2011), and construct a second measure based 
on vector space model (VSM), which captures the extent to which an article is dissimilar to the 
most recent articles for the same firm.  
2 Due to the relatively high data collection cost, I restrict the sample of journalists to those that have at least 10 articles 




                                                             
I begin by replicating Tetlock et al. (2008), who find at the firm level that qualitative 
information as measured by a firm’s aggregate tone across articles can predict earnings surprises 
around earnings announcements. I find consistent evidence using both measures of qualitative 
information (i.e., media tone and VSM). I next examine at the article level whether the observed 
earnings predictability varies across articles written by journalists with different attributes. The 
results show that articles written by journalists with more experience or a higher reputation have 
greater earnings predictability (after controlling for analyst forecasts), suggesting that these 
journalist attributes significantly affect the information content of news.  
Given these findings, one might ask why these attributes matter, that is, what is the source 
of such information advantage? This raises a more fundamental question: How do journalists 
produce information? This is a particularly interesting question given that a vast majority of 
financial journalists are not trained in accounting or finance, and yet their articles predict firm 
fundamentals above and beyond analysts’ forecast and historical accounting information. 
Conversations with journalists suggest that an important channel through which they generate first-
hand information is through industry networks (e.g., networks with analysts, insiders, or 
professors). Ex ante, however, it is unclear that more experienced and reputable journalists’ 
information advantage should be due to greater access to industry networks as analysts may have 
access to the same networks. Thus, whether the networking channel does indeed allow some 
journalists to produce news with incremental information content over other information 
intermediaries is an empirical question. 
To shed light on the networking channel, I use quotes in the news articles to gauge the 
strength of a journalist’s network and examine whether it affects the information content of news. 
To do so, I first extract sentences with quotes from each article. After carefully deleting quotes 
from public statements (e.g., annual reports, analyst reports) or speeches (e.g., conference calls), I 
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identify four types of information sources: insiders (e.g., executives and directors), analysts, 
institutional investors, and other experts (e.g., professors, industry experts). I find that more 
experienced and reputable journalists are more likely to quote these external sources in their news 
reports. Moreover, although articles with quotes from analysts do not exhibit incremental earnings 
predictability over analyst forecasts, articles with quotes from the other types of sources do show 
greater earnings predictability on average. These results suggest that an important source of 
information advantage arises from journalists’ ability to access first-hand information from their 
industry networks. 
I next investigate whether the information advantage from the networking channel varies 
with a journalist’s firm-specific experience (i.e., repeated coverage of the same firm). Unlike 
analysts, journalists tend to cover a wide spectrum of companies: an average journalist in the 
sample writes 82 articles but does not cover the same firm more than twice. A subset of journalists, 
however, do provide relatively extensive coverage of specific firms. On the one hand, such firm-
specific experience may allow journalists to build closer ties with management and hence provide 
more informative news; on the other hand, closer ties with management may affect journalists’ 
independence and in turn their ability to provide unbiased news. To examine this issue, I construct 
two measures of firm-specific experience that capture the volume of firm-specific coverage and 
the intensity of firm-specific insider access. First, I find that journalists with a relatively high 
volume of firm-specific coverage tend to rely more heavily on information from management. 
Further, for the subset of experienced and reputable journalists with relatively extensive firm-
specific experience, the information advantage is completely muted—for those who repeatedly 
cover the same firm or obtain first-hand information from management their news articles do not 
exhibit significant earnings predictability. The information advantage of experienced and reputable 
journalists documented above thus obtains only when these journalists remain independent. Taken 
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together, the results suggest that the quality of the information produced by individual financial 
journalists hinges not only on their ability to network, but also on their ability to provide unbiased 
news. 
This study makes contributions to several literatures. First, this study adds to the growing 
literature that examines the role of the media as an information intermediary by investigating how 
individual financial journalists produce information. Specifically, prior research generally takes the 
media to be a homogeneous group. This study takes a first step to study what is inside the black 
box that we call “media” and argues that it is composed of heterogeneous journalists whose 
experience and ability can generate news with different information content. In particular, my 
results suggest that more experienced and reputable journalists, in part due to their networking 
ability, are likely to play a more important information creation role. Second, this study addresses 
a fundamental question that has received little attention in the literature, namely, how does the 
media produce information? My study suggests that financial journalists generate new information 
through their networking with management, experts, and other information intermediaries. 
Understanding the channels through which the media produces news content can enhance our 
understanding of its effect on the capital markets. Third, this paper documents that journalists’ 
independence, a function of their firm-specific experience, matter. When journalists’ independence 
is impaired, their networking information benefit is completely muted. Fourth, this paper also 
complements the literature that examines how attributes of managers, auditors, or analysts can 
affect their performance by showing that experience and reputation can have significant effects on 
the informativeness of media news. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses background and develops 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and research design. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
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Chapter 2: Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 The Media as an Information Intermediary 
While a large literature examines the role of financial analysts and auditors as information 
intermediaries for the capital market, researchers have only recently focused on the role that the 
media plays as an information intermediary (Drake et al. 2014). Many early studies question the 
validity of media as an information intermediary. For instance, Jensen (1979) suggests that the 
media is not an information provider but rather a form of entertainment. Core et al. (2005) similarly 
conclude that media coverage has no impact on executive compensation. In similar spirit, Dyck 
and Zingales (2002) suggest that the media contributes to financial bubbles.3 These studies argue 
that at best the media lacks the knowledge necessary to serve as an information intermediary and 
at worst it negatively affects the economy.  
An emerging line of studies, however, show that the media is an important information 
intermediary for capital market participants. For instance, Miller (2006) finds that 29% of 
documented accounting frauds were first identified by the media. Bushee et al. (2010) define 
information intermediary as an agent that provides information that is new and useful to find that 
the media improves a firm’s information environment by significantly reducing information 
asymmetry. They suggest that the media is a qualified information intermediary because it 
consistently provides information to not only sophisticated investors, but also individual investors 
and regulators.  
3 Some research even suggests that media may play a negative role in the economy. For example, DeAngelo et al. 




                                                             
Consistent with this line of arguments, a growing research shows that the media is an 
important information intermediary to the capital market.4 Tetlock (2007) finds that media tone 
predicts aggregate market valuation, i.e. market index and trading volume.5 Tetlock et al. (2008) 
further provide evidence that media tone can predict fundamentals of individual S&P 500 firms. 
Drake et al. (2014) find that the media coverage of annual earnings announcement mitigates cash 
flow mispricing. Fang and Peress (2009) find that stocks with no media coverage earn higher 
returns than stocks with high media coverage. In addition, three recent studies document that media 
has a causal effect on the financial market. Engelberg and Parsons (2011) show that local media 
coverage predicts the magnitude of local trading. Dougal et al. (2012) find that the exogenous 
scheduling of Wall Street Journal columnists has a significant fixed effect on the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average returns that explains 35% of the time-series variation. Roger et al. (2013) find 
that media has a strong effect on trading volume.6  
Despite the increasing interest in media in academic research and in practice, however, we 
know surprisingly little about the people that provide the news—financial journalists—that 
together form the media, as prior work generally takes the media to be a homogeneous group. This 
study takes a first step toward shedding light on the role of individual financial journalists. 
  
4 Li et al. (2011) find that Dow Jones alerts convey value-relevant information to investors.  
5 Garcia (2013) finds that the predictability of media tone for aggregate market returns concentrates in recessions. 
6 There is also a growing interest in the informational role of the media in practice. For example, many investment 
firms model include media tone as part in their strategy models.7 For instance, prior empirical work finds that, relative 
to less experienced subjects, more experienced subjects: 1) have more highly developed cognitive structures (Chi et al. 
1981), 2) search for more information, focusing in particular on more relevant information (Chiesi et al. 1979), 3) place 
greater (less) weight on relevant (irrelevant) cues (Brucks 1985; Shelton 1999), and 4) better understand uncertainty 
and the consequences of their decisions (Beach 1975). 
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2.2 Hypotheses 
2.2.1 Experience and Reputation 
Previous research suggests that individual-level attributes can help explain heterogeneity in 
corporate investment, financial reporting, and organizational practices (Bertrand and Shoar 2003; 
Ge et al. 2011), management forecast frequency and precision (Bamber et al. 2010), and audit 
quality (Gul et al. 2013). In this paper I examine whether two individual journalist attributes – 
experience and reputation – affect the informativeness of news content.  
Extensive theoretical and empirical research in various disciplines examines the effect of 
experience on knowledge acquisition and on performance. “Learning-by-doing” theory (Anzai and 
Simon 1979; Arrow 1962) predicts that the cost of performing a task decreases as experience with 
the task increases, resulting in improved performance. Extensive empirical research in various 
disciplines finds supportive evidence. 7 In the analyst literature, Mikhai et al. (1997), Clement 
(1999), and Sinha et al. (1997) find that forecast accuracy is positively associated with analyst 
experience. Given that financial journalists have a similar information intermediary role as analysts, 
it is plausible that journalists with more experience produce higher quality, that is, more 
informative, news. This argument is consistent with Ahern and Sosyura (2014), who find that 
merger rumors are more likely to hold when the rumors are reported by journalists with more 
experience in the target industry. 
However, while learning-by-doing suggests a positive relationship between experience and 
task performance, psychology researchers provide evidence that learning from experience is 
difficult (Fischhoff, 1982; Alpert and Raiffa, 1982; Thompson, 1990, 1991; Bonner and Walker 
7 For instance, prior empirical work finds that, relative to less experienced subjects, more experienced subjects: 1) have 
more highly developed cognitive structures (Chi et al. 1981), 2) search for more information, focusing in particular on 
more relevant information (Chiesi et al. 1979), 3) place greater (less) weight on relevant (irrelevant) cues (Brucks 1985; 
Shelton 1999), and 4) better understand uncertainty and the consequences of their decisions (Beach 1975). 
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1994),8 and thus more experience may not necessarily lead to learning and in turn improved 
performance.9 Even in the analyst literature the association between experience and performance 
is not without debate. Jacob et al. (1999), for instance, find no evidence of an improvement in 
forecast accuracy with experience once analyst aptitude and brokerage house characteristics are 
taken into account.10 
There is also debate about the effect of experience on agents' risk-taking behavior. On the 
one hand, a number of theoretical models predict that managers become more risk-averse as they 
age. For instance, Prendergast and Stole (1996) suggest that junior agents overreact to new 
information, to signal that they have more information, while senior agents underreact to this 
information. Boyson (2003) further suggests that risk-aversion increases with age, leading to a 
reduction in risky behavior. On the other hand, several studies show that older agents take more 
aggressive or bold actions while younger agents herd or mimic other agents. For instance, Avery 
and Chevalier (1999) argue that as agents gain experience, they become more confident in their 
ability and hence take more risk. Further, Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Hong et al. (2000), and 
Lamont (2002) provide evidence that young agents herd more than older agents. In the context of 
financial journalists, to the extent that those journalists who are willing to take more risk are more 
likely to serve as watchdogs, their news articles are likely to be more informative.  
Turning to reputation, reputation is a widely studied attribute in the analyst literature. For 
instance, Stickel (1992) finds that star analysts have better forecast accuracy because their ranking 
reflects their ability, and Bonner et al. (2007) show that the market overreacts to forecast revisions 
8 Bonner and Walker (1994) find that performance improves only when experience is coupled with feedback. 
9 Indeed, Dawes (1988) suggests that success may have negative as well as positive results when people draw incorrect 
lessons from such experiences. 
10 Clement (1999) suggests that the conflict results between his paper and Jacob et al. (1999) may be due to differences 
in research design. 
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issued by star analysts. Journalists also have their “star” performers. For example, columnists are 
widely considered as knowledgeable journalists with a good reputation, and journalists awarded a 
Pulitzer Prize or Gerald Loeb Award are recognized for providing insightful commentary in 
addition to in-depth coverage of the facts. Thus, providing informative news can establish a 
journalist’s reputation (Starkman 2014). To the extent that reputation reflects a journalist’s ability, 
star journalists’ news articles should be more informative.11 
Meanwhile, journalists are more likely to herd if they have a strong reputation. A number 
of theoretical models posit that if agents with a strong reputation are more likely to mimic others 
and provide less informative information. For instance, Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Zwiebel 
(1995), and Graham (2009) predict that career concerns make agents with a strong reputation more 
conservative. Consistent with these theoretical studies, Li (2002) suggests that analysts with a 
strong reputation are more likely to recommend less risky portfolios, and Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999) find that less reputable fund managers earn significantly higher returns than their more 
reputable colleagues. Overall, these studies predict that more reputable journalists are more likely 
to herd, in which case their articles should be less informative.  
Taken together, whether more experienced and reputable financial journalists provide more 
or less informative news is ultimately an empirical question. 
2.2.2 Information Channel 
If individual attributes matter for journalists, the next question that arises is why, that is, 
what is the source of such information advantage? Conversations with journalists suggest that an 
important channel through which they generate first-hand information is through their industry 
sources (e.g., networks with analysts, insiders, or professors). Hence, a potential source of 
11 Meanwhile, several economic studies suggest that reputation affects product quality (Jin and Kato 2006, Jin and Leslie 2009). 
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information advantage, if any, may be their access to industry networks. Financial journalists 
conduct research on a wide range of areas and potentially have a broader set of sources relative to 
other types of information intermediaries. Further, since the business press is read by millions of 
people, it is a valuable exposure venue for managers, analysts, and fund managers (Blankespoor 
and deHaan 2014; Falato et al. 2012; Malmendier and Tate 2009; Rajgopal et al. 2006; Ree et al. 
2015; Sirri and Tufano 1998 and Soloman et al. 2014).12 Thus they have incentives to provide first-
hand information to journalists. However, other information intermediaries (e.g., analysts) may 
have access to the same networks.13 Further, prior evidence (Patterson 2013) suggests that financial 
journalists lack sufficient training in accounting or finance to digest and interpret the information 
provided by their sources. Therefore, ex ante it is unclear whether access to industry networks 
provides journalists an information advantage in producing incremental information.  
2.2.3 Journalist Independence 
Independence is a key principle of journalism. As Kovach (2001) states in his classic 
textbook The Elements of Journalism, “the critical step in pursuing truthfulness and informing 
citizens is not neutrality but independence.” Given the importance of independence for journalists, 
another question that arises is whether the extent of a journalist’s firm-specific coverage over time 
affects their information advantage, if any, from the networking channel. On the one hand, 
increased coverage of a firm over time allows a journalist to learn more about the firm and hence 
produce more informative news about the firm. This argument is consistent with evidence from 
prior research that analysts generate more accurate earnings forecasts and more profitable stock 
12 For example, Blankespoor and deHaan (2014) find that CEOs promote media coverage by quoting their names in 
firm press release. 
13 For example, Mayew et al. (2013) suggest that analysts can obtain superior private information by asking questions 
during earnings conference calls, and Green et al. (2014) find that analysts generate more informative research by 
accessing management at broker-hosted investor conferences. Overall, these studies suggest that analysts’ information 
comes not only from their own analysis but also from their networks with information sources. 
11 
 
                                                             
recommendations as their experience following a specific firm increases (Mikhail et al. 1997). In 
addition, as journalists develop closer ties with their sources, they may be able to obtain more first-
hand information.14  
On the other hand, prior journalism research suggests that journalist-reader is a form of 
principal-agency relationship (Fengler and Russ-Mohl 2008). Readers (the principal) delegate the 
work of producing information to journalists (the agent). They have an implicit contract that 
journalists are aligned with readers, who ultimately provide revenue. A priori, one might imagine 
that journalists serve the reader without exception, and thus should maximize information 
generation. However, it is difficult and expensive for readers to verify what journalists are actually 
doing and whether journalists have behaved appropriately. If journalists have developed close 
relationship with the company that they are reporting on, this relationship may impair journalist 
independence and thus create conflicts between journalists and readers. For example, journalists 
who have close relationship with a source can sometimes fail to ask the tough questions, the 
questions that should have been asked and answered to fully inform the readers (Pavlik 2004). In 
addition, as journalists become more reliant on a specific source, they may become more concerned 
about jeopardizing their relationship with the source and hence provide more conservative (i.e., 
less informative) reporting (Dyck and Zingales 2003; Pavlik 2004). Butler and Gurun (2012) 
suggest that local media has a more positive tone for local companies. In recent economic literature, 
Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) find that mutual fund recommendations are correlated with past 
advertising in three personal finance publications (Money Magazine, Kiplinger’s Personal Finance, 
14  Financial journalists are much more independent from the firm they cover compared with other information 
intermediaries, for example, financial analysts. First, journalists do not represent an employer who trades on a firm’s 
securities. Second, financial journalists are news-oriented, and they do not tend to stay with the same firm for a long 
period of time. This characteristic is different from financial analysts, as analysts tend to report on the same firm 
repeatedly over time. 
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and SmartMoney) but not in two national newspapers (New York Times and WSJ), suggesting that 
the media is not always unbiased.15  
In short, whether journalists remain independent as they gain firm-specific experience, and 
more importantly, how this relation costs journalist-reader relationship and affects the informative 
of their news content, is ultimately an empirical question. 
  
15 For example, many journalism studies examine how political preference biases reporting at both the individual and 
the media outlet level. Patterson and Donsbach (1996) find that the political preferences of individual journalists bias 
their decisions about story content and headlines. At the media outlet level, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2006) suggest 
that the Republican bias of Fox News convinced 3 to 8 percent of the viewers to vote Republican., and Groseclose and 
Milyo (2005) document a liberal bias among several major media outlets by counting the number of quotes from 
different policy institutes. 
13 
 
                                                             
Chapter 3: Sample and Research Design 
3.1 Main Variables 
3.1.1 Dependent Variable 
Following Tetlock et al. (2008), I measure a firm’s quarterly earnings surprise using both 
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) and standardized analyst forecasts errors (SAFE). In 
particular, I first standardize the seasonal earnings difference by subtracting the previous 20 
quarters’ mean and dividing by the previous 20 quarters’ standard deviation of the seasonal 
earnings difference. I delete the observations with missing earnings data for the most recent 10 
quarters. Similarly, I standardize the median analyst forecast error by dividing by the earnings 
volatility over the previous 20 quarters. I use the median analyst forecast from the most recent 
period in I/B/E/S before the earnings announcement. SUE and SAFE are winsorized at the 1% level. 
3.1.2 Qualitative Information 
I construct two proxies for the qualitative information content of news articles. First, I use 
the percentage of negative words. The classification of negative and positive words is based on the 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary (L&M hereafter). I use this dictionary due to its 
specialization to business texts. For example, the L&M dictionary excludes words that are typically 
not negative in a financial context, such as tax, cost, board, liability, foreign, vice, mine, cancer, 
crude, tire, and capital. Following Tetlock et al. (2008), I standardize the percentage of negative 
words in each news article by subtracting the prior year’s mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation of the prior year’s percentage of negative words. More specifically, the first measure of 
qualitative information content is given by: 
 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 =
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤







 ,                                                               (2) 
 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁  is the mean of NEG and 𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁  is the standard deviation of NEG over the prior 
calendar year. NEG and Neg are winsorized at the 1% level.  
However, the percentage of negative words only picks up one dimension of qualitative 
information content, and thus may fail to capture the incremental information content of a news 
article. This is important in the current context because several news articles with similar tone may 
be released around the same time. To capture incremental information content, I construct a second 
measure of qualitative information that is based on vector space model. In particular, following the 
approach in Tetlock (2011), Hoberg and Phillips (2011), and Brown and Tucker (2011), I first 
calculate the similarity between news articles j and j-k, where 0 < k ≤ 10, with respect to firm i. 
To do so, I extract the text in each news article on the firm and construct a binary words vector. 
The vector length is equal to the number of unique words used across all news articles for the firm. 
For a given news article, an element of this vector is equal to one if the word associated with the 
element is in the news article. To reduce the dimension of vectors and thus computing time, I delete 
a set of common words such as “the”, “a”, “when”, and “while”, and I stem the remaining words 
using the Perl stemming algorithm to remove word tense and form; for example, “stemmer”, 
“stemming”, and “stemmed” would all be stemmed to “stem”. Next, for each news article I 
construct a binary vector 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗, with each element taking a value of one if the associated word is used 
in the given news article and zero otherwise. The similarity between news articles j and j-k is then 
defined by the dot product of their normalized vectors: 






 ,              (3) 
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where θ is the angle between 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗  and 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗−𝑘𝑘, 0 < k ≤ 10, ||𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 || is the vector length of 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗, and ||𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗−𝑘𝑘|| is 
the vector length of 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗−𝑘𝑘. The similarity score takes values between 0 and 1.  
 In the next step, I calculate a measure of the difference between dissimilarity according to 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑘𝑘 = 1− 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑘𝑘 .     (4) 
Finally, for each news article, the VSM-based qualitative information measure is defined 
as the average difference relative to the previous 10 news articles for the same firm: 
𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 = 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 =
∑ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−𝑘𝑘10𝑘𝑘=1
10 .                (5) 
 
 
3.1.3 Experience and Reputation 
As a proxy for experience, I use the number of years that the WSJ reporter has been a 
journalist (EXP). I manually collect data on experience (as well as reputation and other individual 
characteristics, for example, gender, age, education) using LinkedIn and journalists’ personal 
webpages, among other sources. For each year, I sort news articles into those by “experienced” 
versus “less experienced” journalists based on the median number of years’ experience working as 
a financial journalist.  
I use two measures to proxy for reputation. The first measure is journalist award. I manually 
collected the data on three major awards in financial journalist industry and match winner/finalist 
to the list of journalist in my sample. The three awards including in the study are Pulitzer Prize, 
Gerald Loeb Award and John Hancock Award16. I use these three awards because they are the most 
16 The Pulitzer Prize is a U.S. award for achievements in newspaper and online journalism, literature, and musical 
composition. It was established in 1917 by Joseph Pulitzer, and is administered by Columbia University in New York 
City. Prizes are awarded yearly in 14 journalism categories. The Gerald Loeb Award, also referred to as the Gerald 
16 
 
                                                             
well-known awards for achievement in journalism.  Gerald Loeb and John Hancock Awards are 
specifically in recognition of excellence in business and financial journalism. If a journalist has 
been a winner or a finalist for any of the three awards, I classify him/her as a reputable journalist. 
In particular, AWARD is equal to one if the journalist has been a winner or finalist of any of the 
three awards during the sample period, and zero otherwise. The second measure of reputation is an 
indicator for whether the journalist has been a columnist, as columnists write for a newspaper in a 
series and generally have a high reputation. Some columnists appear on a daily or weekly basis. 
For example, Spencer Jakab writes the “Ahead of the Tape” Column for the Wall Street Journal on 
a daily basis. In particular, COLUM is equal to one if the journalist has been a columnist during 
the sample period, and zero otherwise. Details on these variables are presented in Appendix I. 
3.1.4 Information Source 
Financial journalists often cite various sources in order to strengthen their arguments and 
establish credibility with their readers (Bonner et al. 2007; Twedt 2013; Blankespoor and deHaan 
2014; Rees et al. 2015). In some cases, the quotes come second-hand from annual reports or 
conference calls. But in other cases, financial journalists obtain information first-hand through 
interviews or other interactions with their sources. To examine the impact of a journalist’s sources, 
I first extract sentences with quotes from each news article. Next, I screen out quotes that come 
from public sources, such as annual reports, analyst reports, or conference calls. I then identify four 
types of sources: insiders (e.g., executives), analysts, institutional investors, and experts (e.g., 
professor, industry experts). In particular, I code a quote as coming from an insider if the sentence 
Loeb Award for Distinguished Business and Financial Journalism, is recognition of excellence in journalism, 
especially in the fields of business, finance and the economy. The award was established in 1957 by Gerald Loeb to 
encourage reporters to inform and protect private investors as well as the general public in the areas of business, finance 
and the economy. http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/gerald-loeb-awards John-Hancock Award is sponsored by the 
American History of Business Journalism to recognize of Distinguished Business and Financial Journalism. 
17 
 
                                                             
mentions firm executives or the firm’s name right before or after the quote. I obtain executives’ 
names from ExecuComp. I code a quote as coming from an analyst or institutional investor if the 
sentence mentions “analyst” or “fund manager” right before or after a quote. Finally, I code a quote 
as coming from experts if the sentence mentions a professor, institution, university, or research, or 
if it mentions “executive”, “officer”, “director”, “vice president”, etc. right before or after a quote 
but is not classified as from an insider. Details on this procedure are presented in Appendix II. 
3.1.5 Journalistic Independence  
I construct two measures of independence. The first captures a journalist’s firm-specific 
experience. For each article, I define a journalist as having low independence if he or she has 
followed the same firm for at least two years and written more than ten articles. This group 
comprises 22% of the full sample. The second measure captures the intensity with which a 
journalist relies on an insider source. For each article, I define a journalist as having low 
independence if he or she has written more than ten articles about the same firm and more than 50% 
of his or her first-hand information comes from management. Again, only 23% of the sample 
observations fall into this category. 
3.1.6 Control Variables 
Results from prior research suggest that firm size, book-to-market, and trading volume 
should be taken into account when predicting future earnings. I use the log of market value and the 
log of book value to market value at the beginning of the calendar year to measure size and book-
to-market, respectively. Trading volume is calculated as the log of annual shares traded divided by 
shares outstanding at the beginning of the calendar year. Next, I control for a firm’s past returns 
using several measures following Tetlock et al. (2008) – in particular, I calculate abnormal returns 
using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor benchmark model, I regress a firm’s raw return on 
18 
 
the market excess return, a size factor (SMB), and a book-to-market factor (HML) over the 252 to 
31 trading days prior to each earnings announcement, I estimate the cumulative abnormal return 
for the [-30,-3] trading day window (CAR-30,-3), and I estimate the abnormal return on day -2 (CAR-
2,-2). I also control for the intercept from the benchmark model (Alpha-252,-31), where Alpha-252,-31 is 
the cumulative abnormal return over the 252 to 31 trading days prior to each earnings 
announcement. Next, I control for the median analyst earnings forecast revision (REV) and analyst 
forecast dispersion (DISP), where REV is the consensus I/B/E/S forecast in quarter t minus the 
consensus forecast in quarter t-1 for quarter t, and DISP is the standard deviation of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts in the most recent quarter prior to the earnings announcement scaled by earnings 
volatility. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
3.21 Journalist Attributes and Earnings Predictability 
In a first set of tests, I follow Tetlock et al. (2008) and examine the association between 
journalist attributes and earnings predictability on a quarterly basis, as earnings are announced 
quarterly. I calculate the standardized Neg -30,-3 using news stories from 30 to 3 trading days prior 
to each earnings announcement. I exclude the news articles for the 2 trading days prior to earnings 
announcement because Compustat earnings announcement dates may not be exact. 
First, I regress the one-quarter-ahead earnings surprise (SUE or SAFE) on qualitative 
information as measured by Neg -30,-3 or VSM -30,-3, where day 0 is the earnings announcement 
release date, controlling for the current quarter’s earnings surprise, firm size, book-to-market, 




𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁−30,−3 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛼𝛼5𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼8𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑁𝑁−252,−31 + 𝛼𝛼9𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−30,−3 + 𝛼𝛼10𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−2,−2 + 𝜖𝜖       (1A)                                                                                                                                                                                           
|𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡| = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉−30,−3 + 𝛼𝛼2|𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1| + 𝛼𝛼3|𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1| +
𝛼𝛼4|𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1| + 𝛼𝛼5|𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1| + 𝛼𝛼6|𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1| + 𝛼𝛼7|𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1| + 𝛼𝛼8|𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑁𝑁−252,−31| + 𝛼𝛼9|𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−30,−3| +
𝛼𝛼10|𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−2,−2|+ 𝜖𝜖                                                                                                                          (1B)       
 
Second, I run analogous regressions at the individual article level. Regressions at the 
individual article level provide more powerful tests and allow me to control for different attributes 
in one model. Specifically, I regress the one-quarter-ahead earnings surprise (SUE or SAFE) on the 
individual article-level Neg or VSM and the control variables using the following models: 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 +
𝛼𝛼6𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼8𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼9𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼10𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼11𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗
𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼12𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼13𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼14𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆4𝐽𝐽𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 + 𝛼𝛼15𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆4𝐽𝐽𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 +
𝛼𝛼16𝐽𝐽𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆+ 𝛼𝛼17𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝐽𝐽𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼18𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼19𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 +
𝛼𝛼20𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼21𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼22𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼23𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼24𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛼𝛼25𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼26𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑁𝑁−252,−31 + 𝛼𝛼27𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−30,−3 + 𝛼𝛼28𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−2,−2 + 𝜖𝜖                                            (1C)                                                                      
|𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡|= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗
𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼8𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼9𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼10𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤 +
𝛼𝛼11𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼12𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼13𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼14𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆4𝐽𝐽𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 + 𝛼𝛼15𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆4𝐽𝐽𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 +
𝛼𝛼16𝐽𝐽𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆+ 𝛼𝛼17𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝐽𝐽𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼18𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼19𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 +
𝛼𝛼20|𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1| + 𝛼𝛼21|𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1|+𝛼𝛼22|𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1| + 𝛼𝛼23|𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1|+𝛼𝛼24|𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1| +
𝛼𝛼25|𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1�+𝛼𝛼26|𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑁𝑁−252,−31�+ 𝛼𝛼27|𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−30,−3�+𝛼𝛼28|𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−2,−2� + 𝜖𝜖.                                     (1D)                                                                        
 
Based on the discussion above, I predict that the coefficients on the interaction terms 
between negative media tone and journalist attributes, that is,  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤, and 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 , are negative, and that the coefficients on the interaction terms between 
information content and journalist attributes, 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷 , 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 , and 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗




3.22 Information Source 
Next, I examine how financial journalists produce information about firm earnings. To test 
for industry network effects, I estimate the following two models at individual article level using 
articles written by more experienced or reputable journalists:  
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼8𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼9𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼10𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛼𝛼11𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼12𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼13𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼14𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼15𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼16𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑁𝑁−252,−31 +
𝛼𝛼17𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−30,−3 + 𝛼𝛼18𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−2,−2 + 𝜖𝜖                                                                                                  (2A)             
                                    
|𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡|= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼8𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼9𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁 +
𝛼𝛼10|𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1| + 𝛼𝛼11|𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1|+𝛼𝛼12|𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1| + 𝛼𝛼13|𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1|+𝛼𝛼14|𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1| +
𝛼𝛼15|𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1�+𝛼𝛼16|𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑁𝑁−252,−31�+ 𝛼𝛼17|𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−30,−3�+𝛼𝛼18|𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−2,−2� + 𝜖𝜖.                                      (2B)                            
       
I predict that the coefficients on the interaction terms between negative media tone and 
different types of information sources (𝛼𝛼3, 𝛼𝛼5, 𝛼𝛼7, 𝛼𝛼9) are negative, and that the coefficients on the 
interaction terms between information content and the different types of information sources (𝛼𝛼3, 
𝛼𝛼5, 𝛼𝛼7, 𝛼𝛼9) are positive. 
3.23 Independence and Information Advantage 
In a third set of tests, I examine whether industry network effects are impacted by the extent 
of a journalist’s firm-specific experience as measure by firm-specific coverage and network. In 
particular, I estimate the following two models at the article level using articles written by more 
experienced or reputable journalists:  
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 +
𝛼𝛼4𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼7𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼8𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼9𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛼𝛼10𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑁𝑁−252,−31 + 𝛼𝛼11𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−30,−3 + 𝛼𝛼12𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−2,−2 + 𝜖𝜖                                                                   (3A)    
                                    
|𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡|= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 +
𝛼𝛼4|𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1| + 𝛼𝛼5|𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1|+𝛼𝛼6|𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1| + 𝛼𝛼7|𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1|+𝛼𝛼8|𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1| +
𝛼𝛼9|𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1�+𝛼𝛼10|𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑁𝑁−252,−31�+ 𝛼𝛼11|𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−30,−3�+𝛼𝛼12|𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅−2,−2�+ 𝜖𝜖.                                         (3B) 
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3.3  Sample and Data 
Table 1, Panel A summarizes the sample selection. I start with all news articles from the 
WSJ between July 1995 and June 2012. I then focus on those articles about S&P 500, S&P MidCap 
400, and S&P SmallCap 600 firms. I delete firm-specific articles that do not mention the firm’s 
name at least once within the first 25 words, including the headline, and at least twice within the 
full story. In addition, I omit articles that do not contain at least 50 words, and at least 5 words that 
are either positive or negative. I obtain data on earnings, book value, market value, annual shares 
traded, and annual shares outstanding from Compustat, while S&P index constituents and stock 
price data come from CRSP. Analyst forecast information is from I/B/E/S. Using an automated 
program I extract the journalist’s name from the news, omitting articles for which no authoring 
journalist is listed. To be included in the sample, I require that each journalist have at least 10 news 
articles. The final sample comprises 132,107 news articles on S&P 1500 firms representing 1,404 
unique financial journalists.  
Table 1, Panel B summarizes the number of news articles, the number of journalists, and 
the average number of news articles per journalist by year. The number of news articles and number 
of journalists are relatively stable during the sample period. On average, each year 496 journalists 
write 10,425 news articles. 
Panel C of Table I presents descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest and the 
controls. The median Neg (VSM) is 0.021 (0.759). Panel D presents Pearson and Spearman 
correlations for the main variables over sample period. I find that Neg (VSM) has a strong negative 
(positive) and significant correlation with the one-quarter-ahead earnings surprise. This 
preliminary result implies that the qualitative information content of news articles contains 
incremental information for future earnings.  
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[Insert Table 1] 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the sample of WSJ financial journalists. The 
average WSJ reporter has been a journalist for 15 years. Fourteen percent of journalists have been 
winners or finalists of a Pulitzer Prize, Gerald Loeb Award, or John Hancock Award, while twenty 
percent of journalists have been a columnist. Thirty-eight percent of journalists are female. The 
most common undergraduate major is journalism (38%), followed by English (17%), history (10%), 
political science (8%), international studies (8%), and business (7%); these results suggest that the 
financial journalists at the WSJ have little finance or accounting background over the sample period. 





Chapter 4: Empirical Results 
Table 3 presents results for tests in which I replicate Tetlock et al. (2008) using the full 
sample. Consistent with Tetlock et al. (2008), in Panel A I find that the fraction of negative words 
predicts low earnings: the coefficient on Neg -30,-3 is -0.015 (-0.006), significant at the 1% (5%) 
level in model 1 (2). Similarly, in Panel B the coefficient on VSM -30,-3 is positive and significant 
(0.065 and 0.010). Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest that qualitative information content 
contains incremental information for future earnings.  
[Insert Table 3] 
As discussed above, although VSM is not without its own limitations, it captures multiple 
dimensions of news content and thus is more likely to capture the unique content of each news 
article, which is particularly important in the context of this paper. I therefore view it as my main 
measure of qualitative information content. To streamline the discussion, below I focus the 
discussion primarily on results using VSM.  
4.1 Journalist Attributes and Earnings Predictability  
Table 4 presents results on how experience and reputation affect the informativeness of 
news articles (Panel A for Neg, Panel B for VSM). In Panel B columns 1 and 3, VSM * LnEXP and 
VSM * Columnist have positive and significant coefficients (0.068, 0.037, 0.018, and 0.013 
respectively), consistent with the predication that articles written by more experienced or reputable 
financial journalists are more informative about firm earnings. In untabulated results, the 
coefficient on VSM * Award is positive and significant if I do not control for experience and the 
columnist dummy, suggesting that the effect of experience and being a columnist subsumes the 
effect of receiving an award. In columns 2 and 4, I add additional attributes, for example, gender, 
economics major, MBA, top 4 journalism school, journalism major, and other liberal arts majors. 
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The coefficients on VSM * LnEXP and VSM * Columnist continue to be positive and significant. 
Interestingly, I find some evidence that female journalists or journalists with a major in journalism 
provide more informative news for firm earnings, as the coefficients on VSM * Gender and VSM * 
Journalism are positive and significant. Overall, the results suggest that experienced or reputable 
journalists have an information advantage compared with other journalists.  
[Insert Table 4] 
 
4.2 Information Channels 
As Table 2 shows, only 7% of financial journalists have a business education. The puzzle 
lies in the fact that the financial journalists are not trained in accounting or finance yet their news 
articles predict firm fundamentals above and beyond analyst forecasts and historical accounting 
information. To shed light on the source of such information advantage I examine the detailed 
quotes from news articles. Table 5, Panel A presents descriptive statistics on news articles with 
quotes from different types of sources. The panel shows that the average percentage of articles that 
quote insiders, analysts, institutional investors, and experts is 14.2%, 8.5%, 12.1%, and 9.2%, with 
a standard deviation of 50.2%, 43.3%, 32.5%, and 39.2%, respectively. Panel B presents binary 
logit estimation results separately for news articles with quotes from the four types of sources. The 
estimation results provide some interesting insights. I show that the coefficients on LnEXP and 
Columnist are positive and significant across all models, suggesting that experienced and reputable 
journalists rely more heavily on first-hand access to management, analysts, institutional investors, 
and other external experts. Interestingly, I find that female journalists are more likely to quote 




[Insert Table 5] 
Table 6 provides regression results for Equations (2A) and (2B) for experienced (Panels A 
and B) and reputable (Panels C and D) journalists. Recall that for each year I define as experienced 
journalists the top 50% of journalists in terms of experience in journalism, and I define as 
inexperienced journalists the remaining journalist sample; similarly, I define reputable journalists 
as those who have been columnists. In Panel B columns 1 to 5, I find that the coefficients on VSM 
* Insider, VSM * Analyst, VSM * Fund, and VSM * Expert are all positive and significant, 
suggesting that first-hand access to management, analysts, institutional investors, and other 
external experts predicts firm fundamentals above and beyond historical accounting information. 
In columns 6 to 10, the results are generally similar except for quotes from analysts. Interestingly, 
the coefficient on VSM * Analyst is negative but insignificant in columns 7 and 10. This result 
implies that analysts have incorporated the information they share with journalists into their 
earnings forecasts, and thus the quotes from analysts do not have incremental predictability about 
firm earnings beyond analyst forecasts. I find similar results for columnists in Panel D, where the 
coefficients on VSM * Insider, VSM * Analyst, VSM * Fund, and VSM * Expert are 0.013, 0.016, 
0.113, and 0.018, respectively, all significant at the 5% level. Taken together, these results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that an industry network is an important channel through which 
experienced or reputable journalists produce informative news. 
[Insert Table 6] 
4.3 Independence and Information Advantage 
In my third set of tests, I investigate whether the information advantage arising from the 
networking channel is impacted by the extent of a journalist’s firm-specific coverage or network. 
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics on news articles written by the same journalist on the same 
26 
 
firm in a given year. On average, a journalist writes 1.762 news articles about a firm each year. In 
addition, less than 15% of journalist-firm pairs have more than three articles per year. These results 
suggest that unlike analysts, financial journalists do not tend to cover the same firm.  
[Insert Table 7] 
In Table 8, I report results for Equations (3A) and (3B) for experienced and reputable 
journalists. Panels A and B (C and D) present results for firm-specific coverage (firm-specific 
network). In Panel B, the coefficients on VSM* High_cov are all significant and negative, resulting 
in an insignificant coefficient on VSM + VSM * High_cov. For example, in column 1, the 
coefficient on VSM + VSM * High_cov is 0.006, with a p-value of 0.686. These results suggest that 
firm-specific coverage has a significant effect on the information advantage of an experienced or 
reputable journalist. I do not find information advantage for those who repeatedly cover the same 
firm. Similarly, in Panel D I do not find evidence of an information advantage for those whose 
information on a specific firm comes largely from firm insiders. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that the information advantage of industry networks is present only when the experienced 
or reputable journalists remain independent—for those who repeatedly cover the same firm or 
obtain first-hand information from management, the networking information advantage is 
completely muted. These results suggest that the quality of the information produced by individual 
financial journalists hinges critically on their ability to both network with sources and provide 
unbiased news. 
 [Insert Table 8] 
4.4 Additional Analyses 
In this section, I perform two additional tests. In the first test, I employ news articles about 
firm fundamentals, and in the second I use a revised version of VSM.  
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4.4.1 Earnings News 
As discussed in Tetlock et al. (2008), news articles that mention the word stem “earn” are 
more likely to contain information about firm fundamentals than other news articles. I re-run 
Equations (1C), (1D), (2A), (2B), (3A), and (3B) using news articles that mention the word stem 
“earn”. Table 9 reports the results of this additional analysis. In Panel A columns 1, the coefficients 
on VSM * LnEXP, VSM * Award, and VSM * Columnist are 0.049, 0.039, and 0.027, respectively, 
all significant at 5% level. These results are consistent with Table 4.  In Panel B column 1, I find 
that the coefficients on VSM * Insider, VSM * Analyst, VSM * Fund, and VSM * Expert are 
generally positive and significant, consistent with Table 6. Again, in column B I do not find that 
journalists have an information advantage beyond analysts if they obtain information largely from 
analysts. Similarly, in Panel C I do not find evidence of an information advantage for those 
journalists who repeatedly cover the same firm or obtain first-hand information from management 
of the firm they cover. 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
4.4.2 Including Dow Jones Business News 
One limitation of the VSM measure is that it captures incremental information content 
relative to prior WSJ articles. To the extent that other media sources (in particular, more timely 
newswires) provide such information first, this measure may be misspecified. To address this 
problem, I construct a revised version of VSM, namely, VSM2, using an extended sample that 
includes articles in both WSJ and Dow Jones Business News.  
Due to the high cost of downloading news articles, I only collect articles from Dow Jones 
Business News between January 2004 and June 2012. Again, I focus on articles about S&P 500, 
28 
 
S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 firms, I require that each firm-specific story mention 
the firm’s name at least once within the first 25 words (including the headline) and at least twice 
within the full story, and I require that each news article contain at least 50 words and at least 5 
words that are either positive or negative. I add the new observations to the sample used in the main 
analyses above. Then, as before, I calculate VSM2 as 1 minus the similarity between news articles 
j and j-k, 0 < k ≤ 10, about firm i, where article j is still from WSJ but the 10 articles prior to j 






;  Informationj,j−k = 1 − Similarityj,j−k. 
Table 10 reports the results using VSM2. The results are consistent with those presented in 
Tables 4, 6, and 8. 
[Insert Table 10] 
4.5 Robustness Test 
In untabulated analyses, the news articles written by more experienced or reputable 
journalists get stronger market reaction for the news announcement day and the day after. This 
result is consistent that news articles written by experienced and reputable financial journalists are 
more informative. In addition, I find that the results are robust to an alternative measure of media 
tone, Net, which is the standardized fraction of net negative words (i.e., the number of negative 
words minus the number of positive words). The results are similarly unaffected when I define 
experienced journalists as the top 25% in terms of years of experience or when I use age to capture 
experience. As an additional check, I reestimate Equations (1C), (1D), (2A), (2B), (3A) and (3B) 
using only those news articles published on Page B3 of WSJ. This test addresses the self-selection 
concern that more experienced journalists’ articles may be published on the front page. Again, the 







Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Recent research in accounting and finance suggests that the media plays an important role 
in the capital market. Most studies view the media collectively as a homogeneous group and we 
know little about the specific role that individual financial journalists play as an information 
intermediary, and more importantly, the channels through which they produce information. This 
study takes a first step to address these issues.  
Using a sample of 296,497 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) news articles, I find that the news 
articles written by more experienced and reputable financial journalists are more informative about 
future earnings. Their articles are also more likely to include quotes from external sources such as 
management or institutional investors, suggesting that experienced and reputable journalists have 
access to a wider industry networks. I further find evidence that articles with more quotes from 
external sources are more informative. Interestingly, this information advantage is present only 
when the experienced and reputable journalists remain independent—for those who repeatedly 
cover the same firm or reply primarily on information from management, the networking 
information advantage is completely muted. Taken together, these findings suggests that the quality 
of the media as an information intermediary depends critically on individual journalists’ ability to 
access information from industry networks and provide unbiased news.
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Appendix I: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Neg Standardized negative tone of each news story; 
Neg -30,-3 Standardized negative tone using news stories from 30 to 3 trading days prior to 






,  Informationj,j−k = 1 − Similarityj,j−k 
VSM -30,-3 The mean of VSM for the news stories from 30 to 3 trading days prior to each 
earnings announcement. 
SUE Seasonal difference of earnings by subtracting the previous 20 quarters’ mean 
and dividing by the previous 20 quarters’ standard deviation of seasonal 
difference of earnings; |SUE| is the absolute value. 
SAFE Median analyst forecast error by dividing the earnings volatility during the past 
20 quarters; |SAFE| is the absolute value. 
CAR -2,-2 Abnormal return for 2 trading day before each news release date; |CAR -2,-2| is 
the absolute value. 
CAR -30,-3 Cumulative abnormal return for 30 to 3 trading days before each news release 
date; | CAR -30,-3| is the absolute value. 
EXP The number of years of working experience as a business journalist;  
Award An indicator variable equal to 1 if the journalist has been the winner or finalist 
for any of the three awards, Pulitzer Award, Gerald Loeb Award and John 
Hancock Award, and 0 otherwise; 
Columnist An indicator variable equal to 1 if the journalist is a columnist and 0 otherwise; 
Gender An indicator variable equal to 1 if the journalist is a female and 0 otherwise; 
Economics An indicator variable equal to 1 if the journalist has an econ major and 0 
otherwise; 
MBA An indicator variable equal to 1 if the journalist has a MBA degree and 0 
otherwise; 
Top4Jschool An indicator variable equal to 1 if the journalist is graduated from top four 
journalism schools and 0 otherwise; 
Journalism An indicator variable equal to 1 if the journalist has a journalism major and 0 
otherwise; 
Artmajor An indicator variable equal to 1 if the journalist has a major in English, History, 
Political Science, Communication, International Studies, Literature, Law, or 
Philosophy and 0 otherwise; 
High_Cov An indicator variable equal to 1 if the journalist has followed the same firm for 
at least two years and written more than ten articles; 
High_InsiderInt An indicator variable equal to 1 if 50% of the journalist’s first-hand information 
is from management and the journalist has written more than ten articles about 
the firm. 
LnMKT Log of market value; | LnMKT | is the absolute value. 
LnBM Log of book value to market value; | LnBM | is the absolute value. 
LnTV Trading volume is calculated as the log of annual shares traded divided by shares 
outstanding at the beginning of the calendar year; | LnTV | is the absolute value. 
DISP DISP is calculated as the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts in 
the most recent time period prior to the earnings announcement scaled by 
earnings volatility; | DISP | is the absolute value. 
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REV REV is the consensus I/B/E/S forecast in quarter t minus the consensus forecast 
in quarter t-1 for quarter t; | REV | is the absolute value. 
Alpha-252,-31 In earnings predictability test, Alpha-252,-31 is the cumulative abnormal return 
over the estimation window of 252 to 31 trading days prior to each earnings 
announcement. In return predictability test, Alpha-252,-31 is the cumulative 
abnormal return over the estimation window of 252 to 31 trading days prior to 
each news release date; | Alpha-252,-31| is the absolute value. 
Experienced News articles are classified into two groups based on the journalist working 
experience and age. The first group represents news articles wrote by more 
experienced journalists (“experienced”), from 51 to 100 percentile in terms of 
the number of years of working experience as a business journalist; 
Less Experienced The second group represents news articles wrote by less experienced journalists 
(“less experienced”) journalists, up to 50 percentile in terms of the number of 
years of working experience as a business journalist; 
Analyst An indicator variable equal to 1 if the news article quotes analysts; 
Fund An indicator variable equal to 1 if the news article quotes institutional investors; 
Insider An indicator variable equal to 1 if the news article quotes insiders, i.e., 
executives and directors; 
Expert An indicator variable equal to 1 if the news article quotes experts, i.e., 
professors, researchers, and industry experts; 




;  Informationj,j−k = 1 − Similarityj,j−k  ; The 10 
articles include not only WSJ but also Dow Jones Business News; 
Net Standardized net negative tone of each news story; 
Net -30,-3 Standardized net negative tone using news stories from 30 to 3 trading days 






Appendix II: Data Collection 
 
I first extract sentences with quotes and contain “said”, “say” or “says.” I screen out quotes 
that come from public sources, such as annual reports, analyst reports, or conference calls.  
In particular, I exclude the quotes if the sentences mentions “statement”, “conference call”, 
“annual report”, “announcement”, “speech”, “10-K”, “10-Q”, “8-K”,  “Form D”, “S-1”, 
“Form 144”, “20-F”, “6-K”, “11-K”, “DEF 14-A” and “SEC filing” right before or after 
the quote.  
I then identify four types of sources: insiders (e.g., executives), analysts, institutional 
investors, and experts (e.g., professor, industry experts). In particular, I code the quote as 
“insider” if the sentence mentioned the name of firm’s top executive right before or after a 
quote. The executives’ names are collected from ExecuComp. In addition, I code the quotes 
as “insider” if the sentence contains the firm name and  mentions “executive”, ”officer”, 
“director”, “manager”, “president” or “chairman” right before or after the quote. I code the 
quote as “analyst” if the sentence mentions “analyst”, “broker”, or “brokerage” right before 
or after a quote. I then code the quote as “institutional investor” if the sentence mentions 
“trader”, “fund manager”, “money manager”, “portfolio manager”, “equity strategist”, 
“equity manager”, “money strategist”, “portfolio strategist”, “stock strategist”, “manager 
of hedge fund”, “head of trading”, “investment strategist”, “investment manager”, “market 
strategist”, “option strategist”, “trading strategist”, “fixed-income strategist”, “derivatives 
specialist”, “director of portfolio strategy”, “money management”, “capital management”, 
“asset management”, or “wealth management”  right before or after a quote.  Finally, I code 
the quote as experts if the sentence mentions “professor”, “faculty”, “university”, “research 
institute”, “expert”, “economist”, “scientist”, “physician”, “commissioner”, “former”, 
“specialist”, or mentioned “executive”, “officer”, “director”, “manager”, “president”, 




Table 1: Sample Description 
Table 1, Panel A presents the main sample selection criteria. Panel B presents the number of news articles, 
number of journalists, and average number of news articles written by each journalist per year. Panel C and 
presents descriptive statistics over the sample period from July 1995 to June 2012. In Panel D, Pearson 
correlations are presented above the diagonal and Spearman correlations are presented below the diagonal. 
Correlations in bold are statistically significant at the p<0.10 level, using two tailed tests.  All variables are 
defined in the appendix I. 
 




S&P 1500 News Articles 296,497 
  
Less Articles without an author (88,886) 
Less Articles with an author who wrote less than 10 articles in the 
sample period 
(33,102) 
Less Articles without available attributes data (35,959) 
Less observations without available Compustat, CRSP or IBES data (6,443) 
  




Panel B: Sample with Author by Year 
 Num of articles Number of journalists Number of articles per journalist 
1995 2,928 235 12.460 
1996 6,229 303 20.558 
1997 6,769 344 19.677 
1998 7,442 397 18.746 
1999 7,305 496 14.728 
2000 5,452 430 12.679 
2001 8,171 547 14.938 
2002 7,587 431 17.603 
2003 6,009 364 16.508 
2004 9,808 419 23.408 
2005 10,119 464 21.808 
2006 7,298 457 15.969 
2007 7,701 479 16.077 
2008 10,127 423 23.941 
2009 10,517 482 21.820 
2010 7,915 479 16.524 
2011 8,037 420 19.136 




Panel C: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable NO.        Mean           Std 25% 50% 75% 
Neg  132,107 0.231 1.112 -0.463 0.021 0.699 
VSM 132,107 0.748 0.111 0.675 0.759 0.831 
SUE 132,107 -0.011 0.252 -0.007 0.000 0.006 
SAFE 132,107 0.003 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.001 
LnMKT 132,107 9.608 1.919 8.212 9.832 11.106 
LnBM 132,107 -1.004 0.854 -1.530 -0.965 -0.455 
LnTV 132,107 13.053 0.896 12.413 13.008 13.685 
DISP 132,107 0.318 0.734 0.019 0.050 0.283 
REV 132,107 -0.050 0.287 -0.048 -0.004 0.017 
Alpha-252,-31 132,107 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
CAR -30,-3 132,107 0.000 0.099 -0.046 -0.003 0.045 
CAR -2,-2 132,107 0.001 0.023 -0.009 0.001 0.011 
 
 
Panel D: Correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) SUE  0.06 -0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 
(2) SAFE 0.36  -0.28 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.10 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 
(3) Neg -0.07 -0.08  -0.17 -0.01 0.03 -0.21 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.11 0.18 
(4) VSM 0.07 0.10 -0.11  0.34 0.18 0.21 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.06 0.08 
(5) LnEXP 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.02  0.18 0.11 0.11 -0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
(6) Award 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.09  0.30 -0.23 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.12 0.05 0.01 -0.04 
(7) Columnist 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.10 0.13  -0.35 -0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.10 -0.06 -0.07 
(8) LnMKT 0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00  0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.09 
(9) LnBM -0.15 -0.15 0.13 -0.07 -0.02 0.06 -0.05 -0.35  0.13 0.11 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
(10) LnTV -0.07 0.00 0.09 -0.12 -0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.25 0.28  0.10 -0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.00 
(11) DISP -0.10 -0.11 0.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.29 0.28  0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 
(12) REV 0.30 0.35 -0.07 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.07 -0.19 -0.07 -0.23  -0.08 0.02 0.02 
(13) Alpha-252,-31 0.26 0.22 -0.09 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.24 0.02 -0.09 0.24  -0.02 -0.03 
(14) CAR-30,-3 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.24  0.40 
(15) CAR-2,-2 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.08  
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Table 2: Background Information of Financial Journalists 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on attributes of financial journalists. All variables are defined in the 
appendix I. 
 
Variable No. Mean Std 25% 50% 75% 
EXP 1112 15.774 9.241 9 14 21 
Columnist 1404 0.201 0.401 0 0 0 
Award 1404 0.139 0.347 0 0 0 
Gender 1157 0.380 0.486 0 0 1 
MBA 911 0.054 0.226 0 0 0 
Master 911 0.440 0.497 0 0 1 
       
Major       
Journalism 911 0.379 0.485 0 0 1 
English 911 0.167 0.373 0 0 0 
Econ/Business 911 0.071 0.258 0 0 0 
History 911 0.097 0.296 0 0 0 
International Studies 911 0.078 0.268 0 0 0 
Communication 911 0.036 0.187 0 0 0 
Literature 911 0.040 0.195 0 0 0 
Law 911 0.016 0.127 0 0 0 
Philosophy 911 0.010 0.099 0 0 0 
Science 911 0.024 0.154 0 0 0 
Political Science 911 0.081 0.273 0 0 0 





Table 3: Media and Earnings Surprises 
Table 3 reports the results of Equation (1A) and (1B) for the full sample. Day 0 is the earnings announcement date. All variables are defined in the appendix I. In all 




 Media Tone   VSM 
 (1) (2)    (1)  (2)  
 SUE SAFE   |SUE| |SAFE| 
       
Neg-30,-3 -0.015*** -0.006**  VSM-30,-3 0.065** 0.010* 
 (0.002) (0.026)   (0.019) (0.056) 
SUE_lag 0.380***   |SUE_lag| 0.584***  
 (0.000)    (0.000)  
SAFE_lag  0.288***  |SAFE_lag|  0.601*** 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
LnMKT 0.017*** 0.002  |LnMKT| -0.051*** -0.043*** 
 (0.001) (0.401)   (0.000) (0.000) 
LnBM 0.009* -0.004  |LnBM| 0.046*** 0.009*** 
 (0.072) (0.303)   (0.000) (0.007) 
LmTV -0.014** -0.001  |LmTV| -0.033*** -0.022*** 
 (0.024) (0.859)   (0.000) (0.000) 
DISP -0.004 -0.003  |DISP| 0.020** 0.016** 
 (0.526) (0.636)   (0.022) (0.018) 
REV 0.129*** 0.058***  |REV| 0.060** 0.036** 
 (0.000) (0.003)   (0.034) (0.048) 
Alpha-252,-31 39.721*** 13.984***  |Alpha-252,-31| 13.125** -0.189 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.021) (0.877) 
CAR -30,-3 0.012** 0.019***  |CAR -30,-3| 0.067 0.031 
 (0.041) (0.000)   (0.333) (0.430) 
CAR -2,-2 0.007** 0.002  |CAR -2,-2| 0.116 0.241 
 (0.021) (0.242)   (0.591) (0.245) 
Intercept 0.015 -0.016  Intercept 1.891*** 1.682*** 
 (0.821) (0.831)   (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Obs 12,455 12,455  Obs 12,455 12,455 






Table 4. Article Level 
Table 4 reports the results of Equation (1C) and (1D) at article level. Day 0 is the earnings announcement date. All variables 
are defined in the appendix I. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Media Tone 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SUE SUE SAFE SAFE 
          
Neg -1.659** -1.392* -0.770*** -0.529* 
 (0.021) (0.083) (0.005) (0.084) 
LnEXP -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.107) (0.144) (0.254) (0.651) 
Neg * LnEXP -0.464** -0.350** -0.220*** -0.129** 
 (0.022) (0.032) (0.004) (0.035) 
Award 0.005* 0.006** -0.002 -0.003** 
 (0.097) (0.036) (0.108) (0.020) 
Neg * Award -0.023 -0.066 -0.066 -0.095* 
 (0.150) (0.154) (0.147) (0.054) 
Columnist 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002* 
 (0.920) (0.791) (0.249) (0.085) 
Neg * Columnist -0.242** -0.229* -0.102** -0.121** 
 (0.037) (0.065) (0.020) (0.010) 
Gender  -0.012***  -0.003*** 
  (0.000)  (0.010) 
Neg * Gender  -0.082**  -0.090** 
  (0.013)  (0.019) 
Economics  -0.010*  -0.002 
  (0.082)  (0.427) 
Neg * Economics  -0.264  -0.094 
  (0.283)  (0.317) 
MBA  0.007  0.001 
  (0.249)  (0.817) 
Neg* MBA  -0.742**  -0.146 
  (0.017)  (0.115) 
Top4Jschool  -0.009**  -0.000 
  (0.016)  (0.938) 
Neg * Top4Jschool  0.390  -0.008 
  (0.112)  (0.887) 
Journalism  0.001  -0.004*** 
  (0.845)  (0.003) 
Neg * Journalism  -0.077  -0.099* 
  (0.563)  (0.052) 
Artmajor  0.004  -0.000 
  (0.117)  (0.740) 
Neg * Artmajor  -0.096  0.028 
  (0.334)  (0.457) 
SUE_lag 0.410*** 0.403***   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
SAFE_lag   0.283*** 0.275*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
LnMKT 0.010*** 0.008*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnBM 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LmTV -0.001 -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.595) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
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DISP -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.027) (0.032) 
REV 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Alpha-252,-31 18.439*** 18.537*** 3.752*** 3.446*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAR -30,-3 0.048*** 0.068*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAR -2,-2 0.393*** 0.361*** 0.083*** 0.064*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept -0.066*** -0.015 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.543) (0.477) (0.890) 
     
Obs 132,107 96,055 132,107 96,055 
Adj R2 0.186 0.181 0.101 0.0966 
 
 
Panel B. Information Content Based on Vector Space Model (VSM) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES |SUE| |SUE| |SAFE| |SAFE| 
          
VSM 0.224*** 0.134* 0.062** 0.037* 
 (0.009) (0.079) (0.032) (0.070) 
LnEXP -0.032* -0.052*** -0.010* -0.014** 
 (0.050) (0.004) (0.078) (0.028) 
VSM * LnEXP 0.068*** 0.041** 0.018** 0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.043) (0.025) (0.095) 
Award -0.014 0.006 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.171) (0.585) (0.106) (0.246) 
VSM * Award 0.015 0.008 0.006 0.005 
 (0.155) (0.189) (0.174) (0.277) 
Columnist -0.027*** -0.015 -0.009*** -0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.132) (0.003) (0.019) 
VSM * Columnist 0.037*** 0.022* 0.013*** 0.010** 
 (0.002) (0.098) (0.001) (0.017) 
Gender  0.032***  0.004 
  (0.002)  (0.196) 
VSM * Gender  0.037***  0.006 
  (0.006)  (0.156) 
Economics  0.017  -0.005 
  (0.330)  (0.364) 
VSM * Economics  0.028  0.003 
  (0.242)  (0.719) 
MBA  -0.014  0.006 
  (0.525)  (0.379) 
VSM * MBA  0.018  0.008 
  (0.540)  (0.423) 
Top4Jschool  0.006  -0.012*** 
  (0.650)  (0.006) 
VSM * Top4Jschool  0.007  0.014** 
  (0.661)  (0.012) 
Journalism  -0.027**  -0.003 
  (0.015)  (0.482) 
VSM * Journalism  0.031**  0.002 
  (0.034)  (0.723) 
Artmajor  -0.035***  -0.003 
  (0.000)  (0.299) 
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VSM * Artmajor  0.047  0.004 
  
(0.130)  (0.267) 
|SUE_lag| 0.569*** 0.565***   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
|SAFE_lag|   0.615*** 0.607*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
|LnMKT| -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|LnBM| 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|LmTV| -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|DISP| 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|REV| 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|Alpha-252,-31| 3.793*** 3.170*** -0.047 -0.618** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.831) (0.011) 
|CAR -30,-3| -0.070*** -0.091*** -0.022*** -0.028*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|CAR -2,-2| 0.538*** 0.634*** 0.140*** 0.176*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.558*** 0.594*** 0.141*** 0.167*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Obs 132,107 96,055 132,107 96,055 




Table 5 Descriptive Statistics. Financial Journalists and Quotes 
Table 5 Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of news articles with four types of quotes, insider, analyst, institutional 
investor and experts. Panel B presents the binary logit estimation results for news articles with these four types of quotes. All 
variables are defined in the appendix I. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter. P-values are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable NO.        Mean           Std 25% 50% 75% 
Insider 132,107 0.142 0.502 0 0 0 
Analyst 132,107 0.085 0.413 0 0 0 
Fund 132,107 0.121 0.335 0 0 0 
Expert 132,107 0.092 0.392 0 0 0 
 
 
Panel B. Journalist Attributes and Quotes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Logit(Insider=1) Logit(Analyst=1) Logit(Fund=1) Logit(Expert=1) 
          
LnEXP 0.149*** 0.491*** 1.754*** 0.270*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Columnist 0.125*** 0.035* 0.543*** 0.094*** 
 (0.000) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) 
Award 0.054*** 0.038* 0.295*** -0.072*** 
 (0.002) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender 0.023** -0.059*** -0.296*** 0.090*** 
 (0.017) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economics 0.039* 0.296*** 0.240*** -0.070* 
 (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) 
MBA 0.099*** 0.133*** 0.311*** 0.086 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.114) 
Top4Jschool 0.162 0.043* 0.481*** -0.011 
 (0.102) (0.084) (0.000) (0.522) 
Journalism 0.038** 0.008 -0.131*** -0.007 
 (0.037) (0.7674) (0.000) (0.642) 
Artmajor -0.046*** -0.012 -0.187*** -0.061 
 (0.001) (0.528) (0.000) (0.120) 
Intercept -1.497*** -0.140 2.730*** -1.663*** 
 (0.000) (0.326) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs 96,055 96,055 96,055 96,055 
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.013 0.035 0.021 
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Table 6.  Information Channels 
Table 6 reports the results of Equation (2A) and (2B). Panel A and B (C and D) present the results using articles written by experienced journalists (journalists who have 
been columnists before). All variables are defined in the appendix I. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered by firm. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Media Tone 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES SUE SUE SUE SUE SUE SAFE SAFE SAFE SAFE SAFE 
                      
Neg -0.038** -0.013* -0.027* -0.019* 0.008 -0.031** -0.030** -0.028* -0.023* -0.040 
 (0.047) (0.065) (0.089) (0.064) (0.894) (0.048) (0.038) (0.071) (0.083) (0.172) 
Insider 0.004    0.004 0.002    0.002 
 (0.296)    (0.383) (0.129)    (0.121) 
Neg * Insider -0.010**    -0.052* -0.048*    -0.038* 
 (0.045)    (0.071) (0.065)    (0.072) 
Analyst  0.004   0.003  -0.001   -0.001 
  (0.493)   (0.578)  (0.781)   (0.621) 
Neg * Analyst  -0.276*   -0.290*  -0.091   -0.082 
  (0.082)   (0.087)  (0.192)   (0.231) 
Fund   0.012  0.011   0.005  0.005 
   (0.228)  (0.277)   (0.195)  (0.204) 
Neg * Fund   -0.440***  -0.421***   -0.210**  -0.196** 
   (0.008)  (0.009)   (0.037)  (0.042) 
Expert    0.025* 0.024*    0.006 0.006 
    (0.069) (0.075)    (0.220) (0.235) 
Neg * Expert    -0.128** -0.132**    -0.098** -0.094** 
    (0.028) (0.042)    (0.040) (0.041) 
SUE_lag 0.396*** 0.396*** 0.396*** 0.396*** 0.396***      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
SAFE_lag      0.272*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnMKT 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnBM 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LmTV -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.840) (0.871) (0.872) (0.852) (0.842) 
DISP -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.075) (0.073) (0.073) (0.070) (0.076) (0.462) (0.468) (0.471) (0.496) (0.471) 
REV 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Alpha-252,-31 15.944*** 15.821*** 15.918*** 15.920*** 15.907*** 3.791*** 3.773*** 3.782*** 3.786*** 3.773*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAR -30,-3 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.113) (0.132) (0.116) (0.117) (0.115) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAR -2,-2 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.045** 0.046** 0.045** 0.045** 0.045** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
Intercept -0.049** -0.049** -0.050** -0.050** -0.050** 0.015* 0.016* 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.056) (0.050) (0.057) (0.052) (0.054) 
           
Obs 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 
Adj R2 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 
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Panel B. Information Content Based on VSM  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES |SUE| |SUE| |SUE| |SUE| |SUE| |SAFE| |SAFE| |SAFE| |SAFE| |SAFE| 
                      
VSM 0.041** 0.042*** 0.045* 0.044*** 0.043* 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012** 0.011** 0.009* 
 (0.019) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.069) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.022) (0.061) 
Insider -0.002    -0.002 0.003*    0.003* 
 (0.749)    (0.772) (0.091)    (0.082) 
VSM * Insider 0.003**    0.003** 0.004*    0.004* 
 (0.034)    (0.042) (0.078)    (0.080) 
Analyst  -0.001   -0.001  0.001   0.001 
  (0.894)   (0.901)  (0.662)   (0.626) 
VSM * Analyst  0.002*   0.002*  0.002   0.002 
  (0.071)   (0.080)  (0.163)   (0.243) 
Fund   0.023**  0.023**   0.007*  0.007* 
   (0.048)  (0.047)   (0.062)  (0.056) 
VSM * Fund   0.029**  0.027**   0.007**  0.007** 
   (0.023)  (0.043)   (0.019)  (0.024) 
Expert    -0.002 -0.002    -0.006 -0.006 
    (0.934) (0.903)    (0.498) (0.476) 
VSM * Expert    0.012* 0.011*    0.002** 0.003** 
    (0.073) (0.082)    (0.020) (0.041) 
|SUE_lag| 0.565*** 0.565*** 0.565*** 0.565*** 0.565***      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
|SAFE_lag|      0.643*** 0.643*** 0.642*** 0.643*** 0.643*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|LnMKT| -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|LnBM| 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|LmTV| -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|DISP| 0.004** 0.004** 0.003** 0.004** 0.004** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
|REV| 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|Alpha-252,-31| 0.564 0.571 0.575 0.563 0.582 -0.877** -0.877** -0.878** -0.879** -0.878** 
 (0.604) (0.591) (0.597) (0.604) (0.591) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
|CAR -30,-3| -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.242) (0.243) (0.258) (0.242) (0.261) (0.501) (0.507) (0.504) (0.509) (0.506) 
|CAR -2,-2| 0.305*** 0.306*** 0.306*** 0.305*** 0.308*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Intercept 0.384*** 0.385*** 0.382*** 0.384*** 0.384*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
Obs 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 74,179 




Panel C. Media Tone  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES SUE SUE SUE SUE SUE SAFE SAFE SAFE SAFE SAFE 
                      
Neg -0.131** -0.122** -0.119* -0.161** -0.113* -0.046* -0.046** -0.057** -0.057** -0.038* 
 (0.048) (0.024) (0.076) (0.039) (0.092) (0.065) (0.028) (0.017) (0.037) (0.063) 
Insider 0.007    0.007 0.002    0.002 
 (0.174)    (0.197) (0.244)    (0.301) 
Neg * Insider -0.063**    -0.055** -0.060*    -0.051** 
 (0.036)    (0.041) (0.052)    (0.041) 
Analyst  0.006   0.005  0.003   0.003 
  (0.371)   (0.492)  (0.215)   (0.262) 
Neg * Analyst  -0.166*   -0.140*  -0.091   -0.088 
  (0.069)   (0.084)  (0.291)   (0.321) 
Fund   0.011  0.010   -0.003  -0.001 
   (0.367)  (0.391)   (0.935)  (0.895) 
Neg * Fund   -0.605***  -0.586***   -0.117**  -0.126** 
   (0.003)  (0.007)   (0.025)  (0.041) 
Expert    -0.009 -0.010    0.004 0.004 
    (0.626) (0.585)    (0.559) (0.574) 
Neg * Expert    -0.189* -0.199*    -0.060* -0.055* 
    (0.071) (0.082)    (0.083) (0.086) 
SUE_lag 0.379*** 0.379*** 0.379*** 0.379*** 0.379***      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
SAFE_lag      0.292*** 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.292*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnMKT 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.918) (0.899) (0.914) (0.927) (0.925) 
LnBM 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.113) (0.121) (0.114) (0.112) (0.117) 
LmTV 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.288) (0.293) (0.279) (0.295) (0.264) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DISP -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.074) (0.071) (0.070) (0.783) (0.788) (0.789) (0.811) (0.801) 
REV 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Alpha-252,-31 13.105*** 13.081*** 13.111*** 13.091*** 13.132*** 2.366*** 2.362*** 2.367*** 2.370*** 2.362*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAR -30,-3 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
CAR -2,-2 0.141** 0.141** 0.142** 0.142** 0.141** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.995) (0.989) (0.999) (0.994) (0.989) 
Intercept -0.169*** -0.168*** -0.169*** -0.167*** -0.170*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.056*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
Obs 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 




Panel D. Information Content Based on VSM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES |SUE| |SUE| |SUE| |SUE| |SUE| |SAFE| |SAFE| |SAFE| |SAFE| |SAFE| 
                      
VSM 0.068** 0.073** 0.072** 0.071** 0.071* 0.025** 0.026*** 0.023** 0.027** 0.025 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.040) (0.031) (0.052) (0.020) (0.000) (0.035) (0.042) (0.108) 
Insider -0.007    -0.007 0.001    0.002 
 (0.272)    (0.272) (0.483)    (0.473) 
VSM * Insider 0.013**    0.012** 0.003**    0.003* 
 (0.017)    (0.039) (0.016)    (0.065) 
Analyst  0.014*   0.014*  0.001   0.001 
  (0.092)   (0.086)  (0.772)   (0.762) 
VSM * Analyst  0.016**   0.015**  0.001   -0.001 
  (0.022)   (0.047)  (0.127)   (0.656) 
Fund   0.005  0.005   0.003  0.003 
   (0.737)  (0.744)   (0.606)  (0.578) 
VSM * Fund   0.113***  0.111**   0.023***  0.023*** 
   (0.007)  (0.016)   (0.026)  (0.033) 
Expert    -0.014 -0.013    -0.003 -0.002 
    (0.581) (0.621)    (0.755) (0.786) 
VSM * Expert    0.018** 0.017**    0.002** 0.001* 
    (0.017) (0.034)    (0.057) (0.072) 
|SUE_lag| 0.557*** 0.557*** 0.557*** 0.557*** 0.557***      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
|SAFE_lag|      0.652*** 0.652*** 0.652*** 0.652*** 0.652*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|LnMKT| -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|LnBM| 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|LmTV| -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|DISP| 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) 
|REV| 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|Alpha-252,-31| -3.086** -3.051** -3.025** -3.054** -3.048** -1.975*** -1.960*** -1.961*** -1.965*** -1.967*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|CAR -30,-3| -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.311) (0.312) (0.320) (0.306) (0.325) (0.363) (0.371) (0.373) (0.371) (0.367) 
|CAR -2,-2| 0.383*** 0.382*** 0.386*** 0.383*** 0.385*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.362*** 0.357*** 0.357*** 0.359*** 0.360*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
Obs 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 




Table 7. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics on news articles written by the same journalist on the same firm in a given 
year.  
Year NO. Mean Std 25% 50% 75% 90% 
1995 1416 1.785 2.468 1 1 1 3 
1996 3882 1.976 3.860 1 1 2 3 
1997 4293 1.846 3.180 1 1 1 3 
1998 4294 1.801 2.969 1 1 1 3 
1999 4974 1.563 2.091 1 1 1 2 
2000 5657 1.035 0.209 1 1 1 2 
2001 5504 1.053 0.298 1 1 1 2 
2002 3188 1.844 3.160 1 1 1 3 
2003 3314 1.697 2.196 1 1 1 3 
2004 4165 2.024 3.486 1 1 2 3 
2005 4496 2.039 3.925 1 1 2 3 
2006 4515 1.888 2.969 1 1 2 3 
2007 4689 1.818 2.915 1 1 1 3 
2008 4464 1.984 3.631 1 1 2 3 
2009 4945 1.942 3.572 1 1 2 3 
2010 4856 1.885 3.040 1 1 2 3 
2011 4721 1.943 2.944 1 1 2 3 
2012 2442 1.593 1.568 1 1 1 3 




Table 8. Independence and Information Advantage 
Table 8 presents the results for Equations (3A) and (3B) for experienced and reputable journalists. Panel A and B (Panel C 
and D) present results for firm-specific coverage (firm-specific network). 
 
Panel A. High Firm-Specific Coverage (Media Tone) 
 Experienced Journalists  Columnists 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
VARIABLES SUE  SAFE  SUE  SAFE   
                 
Neg -0.381***  -0.013***  -0.279**  -0.170***  
 (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.021)  (0.000)  
High_Cov -0.001  -0.000  -0.010*  -0.002  
 (0.841)  (0.997)  (0.084)  (0.322)  
Neg * High_Cov 0.387**  0.017**  0.344**  0.198**  
 (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.014)  (0.048)  
Neg +  0.006  0.004  0.065  0.028 
Neg * High_Cov  (0.970)  (0.982)  (0.875)  (0.731) 
a         
SUE_lag 0.398***    0.380***    
 (0.000)    (0.000)    
SAFE_lag   0.271***    0.293***  
   (0.000)    (0.000)  
LnMKT 0.010***  -0.002***  0.014***  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.901)  
LnBM 0.009***  -0.002***  0.010***  -0.001  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.110)  
LmTV -0.004***  -0.000  0.002  0.004***  
 (0.004)  (0.912)  (0.244)  (0.000)  
DISP -0.003*  0.000  -0.004*  0.000  
 (0.073)  (0.431)  (0.077)  (0.714)  
REV 0.037***  0.010***  0.040***  0.014***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Alpha-252,-31 15.902***  3.776***  12.931***  2.411***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
CAR -30,-3 0.022*  0.020***  0.055***  0.018***  
 (0.077)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.003)  
CAR -2,-2 0.161***  0.047**  0.139**  0.002  
 (0.002)  (0.018)  (0.046)  (0.954)  
Intercept -0.049**  0.015*  -0.170***  -0.055***  
 (0.020)  (0.065)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
         
Obs 74,179  74,179  32,733  32,733  





Panel B. High Firm-Specific Coverage (VSM) 
 Experienced Journalists  Columnists 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
VARIABLES |SUE|  |SAFE|  |SUE|  |SAFE|   
                 
VSM 0.036***  0.015***  0.066***  0.019***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
High_Cov -0.009  -0.000  -0.012  -0.001  
 (0.532)  (0.957)  (0.543)  (0.825)  
VSM * High_Cov -0.030**  -0.012*  -0.058**  -0.017***  
 (0.021)  (0.076)  (0.046)  (0.001)  
VSM +  0.006  0.003  0.008  0.002 
VSM * High_Cov  (0.686)  (0.784)  (0.586)  (0.792) 
a         
|SUE_lag| 0.566***    0.559***    
 (0.000)    (0.000)    
|SAFE_lag|   0.619***    0.653***  
   (0.000)    (0.000)  
|LnMKT| -0.026***  -0.008***  -0.028***  -0.008***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
|LnBM| 0.023***  0.005***  0.028***  0.006***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
|LmTV| -0.012***  -0.002***  -0.010***  -0.002***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
|DISP| 0.003**  0.001*  0.005***  0.002**  
 (0.019)  (0.087)  (0.009)  (0.011)  
|REV| 0.035***  0.008***  0.029***  0.006***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
|Alpha-252,-31| 1.018  -0.442  -3.374**  -1.805***  
 (0.308)  (0.182)  (0.011)  (0.000)  
|CAR -30,-3| -0.057***  -0.011**  -0.019  -0.007  
 (0.000)  (0.023)  (0.330)  (0.273)  
|CAR -2,-2| 0.415***  0.093***  0.391***  0.146***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Intercept 0.387***  0.094***  0.357***  0.088***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
         
Obs 74,179  74,179  32,733  32,733  





Panel C. High Firm-Specific Network (Media Tone) 
 Experienced Journalists  Columnists 
  (1)   (2)  (3)   (4)   
VARIABLES SUE  SAFE  SUE  SAFE   
               
Neg -0.376***  -0.049***  -0.243**  -0.138***  
 (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.038)  (0.003)  
High_InsiderInt 0.002  -0.001  -0.007  -0.003  
 (0.659)  (0.515)  (0.286)  (0.265)  
Neg * High_InsiderInt 0.398**  0.063**  0.422**  0.089**  
 (0.042)  (0.012)  (0.036)  (0.039)  
Neg +  0.022  0.014  0.179  -0.049 
Neg * High_InsiderInt  (0.903)  (0.674)  (0.256)  (0.374) 
a         
SUE_lag 0.402***    0.380***    
 (0.000)    (0.000)    
SAFE_lag   0.270***    0.292***  
   (0.000)    (0.000)  
LnMKT 0.010***  -0.002***  0.014***  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.741)  
LnBM 0.009***  -0.002***  0.010***  -0.001  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.145)  
LmTV -0.004***  -0.000  0.002  0.004***  
 (0.002)  (0.891)  (0.320)  (0.000)  
DISP -0.003*  0.000  -0.004*  0.000  
 (0.074)  (0.430)  (0.070)  (0.720)  
REV 0.037***  0.010***  0.039***  0.014***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Alpha-252,-31 15.830***  3.821***  13.153***  2.386***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
CAR -30,-3 0.021*  0.020***  0.060***  0.018***  
 (0.088)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  
CAR -2,-2 0.161***  0.044**  0.138**  0.003  
 (0.002)  (0.027)  (0.047)  (0.922)  
Intercept -0.045**  0.015*  -0.164***  -0.056***  
 (0.029)  (0.057)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
         
Obs 74,179  74,179  32,733  32,733  




Panel D. High Firm-Specific Network (VSM) 
 Experienced Journalists  Columnists 
  (1)   (2)   (3)  (4)   
VARIABLES |SUE|  |SAFE|  |SUE|  |SAFE|   
               
VSM 0.037***  0.013***  0.055***  0.023***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
High_InsiderInt 0.004  0.004  0.013  0.015**  
 (0.793)  (0.497)  (0.505)  (0.029)  
VSM * High_InsiderInt -0.036**  -0.013**  -0.050**  -0.028***  
 (0.047)  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.002)  
  0.001  0.001  0.005  -0.005 
  (0.987)  (0.975)  (0.689)  (0.721) 
|SUE_lag| 0.567***    0.645***    
 (0.000)    (0.000)    
|SAFE_lag|   0.618***    0.651***  
   (0.000)    (0.000)  
|LnMKT| -0.025***  -0.008***  -0.028***  -0.008***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
|LnBM| 0.023***  0.005***  0.028***  0.006***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
|LmTV| -0.013***  -0.002***  -0.010***  -0.002***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  
|DISP| 0.004**  0.001*  0.006***  0.002***  
 (0.015)  (0.082)  (0.007)  (0.009)  
|REV| 0.035***  0.008***  0.029***  0.006***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
|Alpha-252,-31| 1.123  -0.476  -3.267**  -1.875***  
 (0.261)  (0.152)  (0.014)  (0.000)  
|CAR -30,-3| -0.061***  -0.010**  -0.020  -0.005  
 (0.000)  (0.034)  (0.305)  (0.400)  
|CAR -2,-2| 0.425***  0.092***  0.388***  0.142***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Intercept 0.390***  0.093***  0.350***  0.084***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
         
Obs 74,179  74,179  32,733  32,733  




Table 9. Earnings News 
Table 9 reports the results from additional analysis using earnings news. All variables are defined in the appendix. In 
all specifications, standard errors are clustered by firm. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Experience and Reputation 
  (1) (2) 
 |SUE| |SAFE| 
      
VSM 0.205* 0.102* 
  (0.277) (0.059) 
LnEXP 0.038 0.018 
 (0.326) (0.221) 
VSM * LnEXP 0.050** 0.025** 
  (0.043) (0.024) 
Award -0.050** -0.024*** 
 (0.036) (0.006) 
VSM * Award 0.058* 0.030** 
  (0.074) (0.015) 
Columnist 0.032 0.003 
 (0.142) (0.686) 
VSM * columnist 0.044** 0.004* 
  (0.031) (0.056) 
|SUE_lag| 0.587***  
 (0.000)  
|SAFE_lag|  0.649*** 
  (0.000) 
|LnMKT| -0.031*** -0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|LnBM| 0.025*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|LmTV| -0.026*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|DISP| 0.009*** 0.002* 
 (0.003) (0.099) 
|REV| 0.030*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
|Alpha-252,-31| 4.806*** 1.451** 
 (0.003) (0.019) 
|CAR -30,-3| 0.006 -0.006 
 (0.804) (0.448) 
|CAR -2,-2| 0.665*** 0.147*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Intercept 0.474*** 0.101* 
 (0.001) (0.059) 
   
Obs 32,392 32,392 




Panel B. Information Channels 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES |SUE| |SAFE| 
   
VSM 0.013 0.026*** 
 (0.109) (0.000) 
Insider -0.062*** 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.434) 
Insider * VSM 0.090*** 0.023** 
 (0.000) (0.020) 
Analyst 0.032 0.020 
 (0.782) (0.342) 
Analyst * VSM 0.019* 0.013 
 (0.078) (0.331) 
Fund 0.019 -0.001 
 (0.279) (0.559) 
Fund * VSM 0.025*** 0.021** 
 (0.002) (0.019) 
Expert 0.083 0.043* 
 (0.167) (0.057) 
Expert * VSM 0.021** 0.068** 
 (0.044) (0.028) 
|SUE_lag| 0.588***  
 (0.000)  
|SAFE_lag|  0.668*** 
  (0.000) 
|LnMKT| -0.031*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|LnBM| 0.027*** 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|LmTV| -0.024*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|DISP| 0.014*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.340) 
|REV| 0.032*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|Alpha-252,-31| 5.352*** 0.279 
 (0.002) (0.684) 
|CAR -30,-3| 0.006 0.024*** 
 (0.805) (0.005) 
|CAR -2,-2| 0.584*** 0.092** 
 (0.000) (0.016) 
Intercept 0.604*** 0.143*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Obs 16,232 16,232 
Adj R2 0.402 0.513 
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Panel C. Independence and Information Advantage 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES |SUE| |SAFE| 
   
VSM 0.043*** 0.009*** 
 (0.109) (0.000) 
High_Cov -0.013* -0.003** 
 (0.060) (0.014) 
High_Cov* VSM -0.044*** -0.010** 
 (0.000) (0.011) 
|SUE_lag| 0.586***  
 (0.000)  
|SAFE_lag|  0.666*** 
  (0.000) 
|LnMKT| -0.031*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|LnBM| 0.028*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|LmTV| -0.025*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|DISP| 0.013*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.690) 
|REV| 0.031*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|Alpha-252,-31| 5.360*** 0.271 
 (0.000) (0.722) 
|CAR -30,-3| 0.006 0.024*** 
 (0.755) (0.002) 
|CAR -2,-2| 0.586*** 0.091** 
 (0.000) (0.044) 
Intercept 0.633*** 0.148*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Obs 16,232 16,232 




Table 10 Additional Test Including Dow Jones Business News 
Table 10 reports the results from additional analysis including Dow Jones Business News over the sample period from 
January 2004 to June 2012. All variables are defined in the appendix I. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered 
by firm. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Experience and Reputation 
  (1) (2) 
 |SUE| |SAFE| 
      
VSM2 0.119* 0.075* 
 (0.059) (0.068) 
LnEXP -0.026*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
VSM2 * LnEXP 0.042** 0.019*** 
 (0.014) (0.005) 
Award -0.015*** -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.541) 
VSM2 * Award 0.036*** 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.157) 
Columnist 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.763) (0.601) 
VSM2 *columnist 0.016** 0.008* 
 (0.030) (0.094) 
|SUE_lag| 0.556***  
 (0.000)  
|SAFE_lag|  0.612*** 
  (0.000) 
|LnMKT| -0.016*** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|LnBM| 0.022*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|LmTV| -0.011*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|DISP| 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|REV| 0.021*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|Alpha-252,-31| 5.121*** 1.562*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|CAR -30,-3| -0.081*** -0.045*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|CAR -2,-2| 0.388*** 0.218*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.402*** 0.163*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Obs 72,970 72,970 




Panel B. Information Channels  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES |SUE| |SAFE| 
   
VSM2 0.005* 0.008** 
 (0.052) (0.000) 
Insider -0.004 -0.000 
 (0.336) (0.845) 
VSM2 * Insider 0.005** 0.001** 
 (0.020) (0.041) 
Analyst 0.033 0.029 
 (0.511) (0.782) 
VSM2 * Analyst 0.009** 0.008 
 (0.021) (0.192) 
Fund -0.000 -0.008*** 
 (0.976) (0.000) 
VSM2 * Fund 0.001** 0.018*** 
 (0.041) (0.000) 
Expert 0.005 0.001 
 (0.691) (0.826) 
VSM2 * Expert 0.026** 0.004** 
 (0.029) (0.024) 
|SUE_lag| 0.513***  
 (0.000)  
|SAFE_lag|  0.586*** 
  (0.000) 
|LnMKT| -0.021*** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|LnBM| 0.022*** 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|LmTV| -0.011*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|DISP| 0.004*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|REV| 0.026*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|Alpha-252,-31| 2.852*** 0.671** 
 (0.000) (0.015) 
|CAR -30,-3| -0.060*** -0.042*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|CAR -2,-2| 0.394*** 0.292*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.312*** 0.133*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs 36,452 36,452 





Panel C. Independence and Information Advantage 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES |SUE| |SAFE| 
      
VSM2 0.045*** 0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
High_Cov 0.001 0.001 
 (0.949) (0.818) 
VSM2 * High_Cov -0.035** -0.022** 
 (0.027) (0.033) 
|SUE_lag| 0.514***  
 (0.000)  
|SAFE_lag|  0.589*** 
  (0.000) 
|LnMKT| -0.021*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|LnBM| 0.022*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|LmTV| -0.012*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
|DISP| 0.005*** 0.002*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
|REV| 0.027*** 0.007** 
 (0.000) (0.012) 
|Alpha-252,-31| 2.805*** 0.673** 
 (0.002) (0.021) 
|CAR -30,-3| -0.059** -0.041*** 
 (0.024) (0.007) 
|CAR -2,-2| 0.391*** 0.296*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.313*** 0.291*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Obs 36,452 36,452 
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